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FOREWORD: JUDGE CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY"
William E. Hellersteint
Judge Constance Baker Motley was born in New Haven
and attended New Haven's public schools. She received her
Bachelor of Arts degree in 1943 from New York University and
her LL.B. in 1946 from Columbia University School of Law.
Judge Motley joined the legal staff of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in her third year at
Columbia Law School and subsequently, as associate counsel,
became its principal trial attorney. It was there that she began
her long colleaguesbip with Thurgood Marshall, and she was
one of the lawyers who, in 1954, helped write the briefs filed in
the landmark school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of
Education.1
In addition to appearing before state and federal courts
throughout the United States in numerous civil rights matters,
Judge Motley argued ten cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court,2 winning nine, which were of key importance in
securing equal rights for black Americans and bringing about
the legal death of discrimination. The litigation that resulted
in the admission of James Meredith to the University of
Mississippi,3 Charlayne Hunter Gault and Hamilton Holmes
*©1996 William E. Hellerstein. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Chairperson, Ad Hoc Committee to
Commemorate Justice Thurgood Marshall, Association of the Bar of the City of
New York.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379
U.S. 306 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Barr v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964); Watson
v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S.
374 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 62
(1961).
' Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
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to the University of Georgia,4 Vivian Malone and James Hood
to the University of Alabama5 and Harvey Gantt to Clemson
College" are some of her better known cases. She also
participated as chief counsel in many other school
desegregation cases supported by the Legal Defense Fund, as
well as cases involving housing, transportation, recreation and
public accommodations.
In 1964, Judge Motley became the first black woman to be
elected to the New York State Senate. She immediately began
a campaign for the extension of civil rights legislation and for
additional low and middle income housing. In February 1965,
she was elected by the Manhattan members of the New York
City Council to fill a one-year vacancy in the office of President
of the Borough of Manhattan and thus became the first woman
to serve in that office and as a member of New York City's
Board of Estimate. She was elected to a full four-year term in
November 1965, when she became the first candidate for the
Manhattan Presidency to win the endorsement of the
Republican, Democratic and Liberal Parties. As Borough
President, Judge Motley drew up a seven-point program for the
revitalization of Harlem and East Harlem, and won a
pioneering fight for $700,000 to plan for the renewal of those
and other underprivileged areas of the city.
On January 25, 1966, President Johnson nominated Judge
Motley for a seat on the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. She was the first woman
appointed to the Southern District bench and the first black
woman appointed to the federal judiciary. She became Chief
Judge of the Southern District on June 1, 1982, and served
until October 1, 1986, when she assumed senior status.
It is entirely fitting that, on the occasion of the
Association's Second Annual Justice Thurgood Marshall
Commemorative Luncheon, Judge Motley should share her
thoughts on the effects of Plessy v. Ferguson,7 on this, the one
hundredth anniversary of that ill-begotten decision.
' Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961).
Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931
(1956).
6 Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina, 320 F.2d 611 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 814 (1963).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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May 18, 1996, is the one hundredth anniversary of the
Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.' Of course,
those of us who have been personally involved in the struggle
of black Americans over the last fifty years are turning our
attention not to a celebration of the infamous Plessy decision
but to a historical assessment of how the country has evolved
in the past century, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
affirmance of the doctrine of "separate but equal."' There are
going to be, for example, several conferences during the next
few weeks at which civil rights advocates, academics and
intellectuals will gather and discuss the historical context of
Plessy, its searing influence on American societal development
and, of course, the revolutionary effect of Plessy's reversal by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.' Plessy
was the Supreme Court's decision to uphold race-based
classifications as consistent with the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, a decision
that took almost sixty years to overturn and whose effects we
still feel to this day.
These conferees will certainly be discussing their concern
about the fact that at the end of the twentieth century, one
hundred years after Plessy, we face the impending demise of
affirmative action. This concern is obviously misplaced.
©1996 Constance Baker Motley. All Rights Reserved.
'Senior Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 Id. at 552.
' Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Affirmative action is already dead. The Supreme Court, by
requiring any such government-based programs to withstand
the "strict scrutiny" test under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, has, in my opinion, effectively killed affirmative
action, except as a remedy for proven past discrimination.4 As
Justice Marshall said in his concurring opinion in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,5 a case involving a federal affirmative action
program, strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."6
The Plessy decision was rendered at a time that parallels
the period in which we now find ourselves at the end of the
twentieth century. The nineteenth century had witnessed an
epic struggle in American society to bring about racial equality
in its racially diverse community of free persons that came into
being after the Civil War and a newly amended Constitution.
The nineteenth century ended with the separate but equal
compromise of the Fourteenth Amendment.! Today, we
Americans find ourselves nearing the end of another epic
struggle for racial equality whose auspicious rise with the
decision in Brown may now decline with the demise of
affirmative action. Just as Plessy signalled that "separate but
equal" would be tolerated, the end of affirmative action in
government programs will undoubtedly signal to many in the
private sector an end to all affirmative action, leaving black
Americans without effective legal redress for continuing racial
discrimination in education, employment and housing.
The nineteenth century, as you know, found us engaged in
a struggle to end slavery, to confer citizenship on the former
slaves and to enact laws designed to protect the former slaves
See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
448 U.S. 448, 519 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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from discrimination by individuals as well as former hostile
southern state governments. At the same time, it was a period
of great uncertainty and dramatic change: politically, socially
and economically.
Winning the emancipation of the slaves in this country
was a long and divisive struggle. The South opposed the
North's effort to free the slaves and correct the economic
distortion caused by the North's paid labor. Civil war was
visited upon this country when the South seceded from the
Union in 1861 and fired upon Fort Sumter. The cause of
human freedom was taken up by President Lincoln who,
pursuant to his war powers, issued a proclamation on January
1, 1863, declaring slaves in states in rebellion against the
United States free.
When the North finally claimed military victory on the
battlefield, Congress was dominated by radical Republicans
determined to make the South pay for the havoc caused by the
war and to accept the end of slavery. Feeling that Lincoln's
emancipation was not sufficient, the radical Republicans
quickly passed in the Congress an amendment to the
Constitution barring slavery on our shores.' The radical
Republicans also shepherded through the Congress the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was expressly designed to
confer national citizenship on the former slaves by granting
citizenship to everyone born in the United States, by
conferring citizenship upon former slaves in the states wherein
they may reside and by expressly prohibiting the states from
denying citizenship rights to these new citizens. Despite these
efforts in the former slave states, the new citizens were denied
the right to vote. In response, another amendment was
proposed by the radical Republicans in the Congress that
protected the former slaves' right to vote."
Five years after the end of the Civil War, the nation faced
a grim reality: approximately four million newly emancipated
' U.S. CONST. amend. XHI, § 1 provides: 'Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or anyplace subject to their
jurisdiction"
' US. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 provides: 'The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.3
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slaves were without jobs, training, family structure or political
power. The Freedmen's Bureau was hastily set up by the
Congress to aid the slaves in their transition from slavery to
freedom, but resistance by former white plantation owners was
fierce, and efforts to keep former slaves from voting became a
major objective of these opponents. Congress began to enact
laws to carry out the purposes of the new amendments to the
Constitution and conferred upon federal district courts the
power to enforce those laws.
Just the thought of freedom had, of course, energized the
black population as they moved about the country-as white
men before them had-seeking work and opportunity for
economic development and expansion. Some blacks even left
the South and tried to reach Kansas and other places so that
they could become homesteaders with free government land.
By 1875, the radical Republicans and the Congress were
satisfied that they had enacted into law all of the protections
that the former slaves needed to enjoy the blessings of
freedom. Resistance to the inclusion of former slaves in the
body politic, however, continued. The former slaves were
excluded from public schools and recreational facilities in the
southern states. They were excluded from railroad cars set
aside for whites and kept from places of accommodation, such
as hotels, restaurants and theaters. Their newly conferred
freedom was largely illusory.
To circumvent the Fourteenth Amendment, which
guaranteed the equal protection of the laws, former
slaveowners-who were basically racists who believed in the
inferiority of blacks and feared the loss of white power and
"superiority" that would come with the intermingling of the
races--decided that in order to keep the white race "pure,"
separate public facilities for blacks had to be established. By
1896, most of the southern states actually had laws requiring
racial segregation, as exemplified by the statute enacted by
Louisiana making it a crime for a black person or a person
with a very small amount of black blood to refuse to leave a
railroad car designated for whites." At the same time, certain
groups, such as the former abolitionists, were moving ahead
with programs to aid blacks. In addition, the era also saw
'0 1890 LA. ACTS 111.
[Vol. 62:8529
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blacks gaining control of the state governments in South
Carolina and Mississippi and a large measure of control in
other places, like Louisiana, where there were large black
populations. By 1896, however, with the withdrawal of federal
troops, former slaveowners were back in full control of state
governments again, and relations between the races were poor
as black men sought to compete with white workers for
whatever jobs were available off the plantation.
Consequently, after a century of agitation to free the
slaves, a civil war, a new Constitution, new laws to protect the
newly freed slaves and general social upheaval stemming from
emancipation of four million people, by 1896, the white
majority had become weary of the race question, which many
people started to consider insoluble because of the white
majority's refusal to accept blacks as political and social equals
and because of the tremendous economic investment required
to prepare blacks for industrial jobs. The Supreme Court
justices were obviously aware of the turmoil that had engulfed
the South, particularly after the Civil War, and felt that the
issue of black equality had to be compromised if the country
was to move ahead in its social and economic development.
When a black man with one eighth black blood challenged
Louisiana's railroad segregation policy in the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court upheld racial segregation as meeting the
equal protection clause requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment." As a result of that Supreme Court
pronouncement, the conflict between two movements-one
toward, and one away from, greater inequality-was resolved
for the time being: the issue of the constitutionality of racial
segregation was settled and a new era of domination of our
political and social institutions by racists was ushered in, with
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. The black community,
of course, was demoralized, along with their white supporters.
Policies that had been initiated by major public and private
institutions to bring blacks into the family, so to speak, were
soon abandoned and the public policy of the country became
one of racial segregation of people of color: that is, blacks and
people of mixed race.
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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When we entered the twentieth century, racial segregation
had become national policy. Blacks were segregated in the
armed forces, and many blacks who had succeeded in getting
elected to Congress in the last century lost their seats. Many
blacks were denied employment in federal agencies in the
District of Columbia where previously they had been employed.
The fledgling National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People struggled with the major issues facing blacks
throughout the country. In particular, it fought for national
legislation banning lynching that never got through Congress
because of opposition from southern politicians.
Two world wars saw Americans fighting for democracy in
segregated military units. During World War II, the
membership of the NAACP doubled as a result of the
thousands of black servicemen overseas who joined the
organization realizing that it was the only agency fighting for
their protection. One poignant incident, which occurred during
World War II and proved particularly embarrassing, involved
American soldiers transporting German prisoners of war on a
bus to a prison camp in the South. Only the black American
serviceman had to ride in the back of the bus while the
German prisoners of war rode in the front.
After the war, ominous agitation for the equal rights of
returning servicemen began to arise in the nation's major
cities. In New York City, black servicemen were denied the
right to rent apartments in Stuyvesant Town, a Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company sponsored housing project to which
New York City had just given a twenty-five year tax
exemption. Levittown, a new community built on Long Island
for returning GIs who had recently been granted low-cost
mortgage insurance by Congress, was closed to black
servicemen. When that new community was built, thousands of
white families left New York City with government aid long
before the Supreme Court's Brown decision. Black servicemen
were similarly barred from Levittown in Pennsylvania.
In 1946, the NAACP and its legal arm decided to make a
direct attack upon the constitutionality of racial segregation. It
was determined that the American institution of segregation
was so entrenched that it could be dismantled only in one area
at a time and that the most important area in which
segregation had to be eliminated was public education. The
[Vol. 62: 529
19961 THURGOOD MARSHALL COM0MEMORATIVE LUNCHEON 537
American experience had demonstrated that people were able
to rise out of poverty if they were able to receive basic
education and training for jobs in the industrial economy.
Racial discrimination thus had two immediate effects on black
Americans: First, it prevented them from gaining the edlication
and training required for economic advancement; second, it
prevented them from gaining employment to enable them to
rise out of poverty and into the working class.
The biggest obstacle to ending racial segregation in
education was, therefore, the Supreme Court's decision of 1896
in Plessy v. Ferguson. The NAACP and its legal unit had been
able to make some incremental progress prior to the war by
attacking racial segregation in southern states where those
states were most vulnerable: that is, at the graduate and
professional school level where separate facilities for blacks
had not been provided.' The NAACP decided to resurrect the
campaign against racial segregation in education and broaden
it to include a legal challenge to the authority of state
governments to operate separate institutions for blacks and
whites.
Thurgood Marshall was the chief counsel for the NAACP
and its legal arm at that particular juncture. He succeeded in
bringing together the best legal minds in the country at that
time committed to equal rights for black Americans. Several
suits were filed that eventually reached the Supreme Court at
the same time and resulted, in 1954, in a decision holding
racial segregation in public education unconstitutional.' The
Court did not explicitly reverse Plessy v. Ferguson, but the
effect of its decision was exactly that. And then, in a series of
cases between 1954 and 1964, racial segregation in all other
public facilities and services was barred by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its decision in Brown." As a result, legal
enforcement of racial segregation came to an end.
Congress, as a result of Martin Luther King's March on
Washington in August 1963, finally resumed its rightful role
' See, e.g., Mlissouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
1 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Assoc. v. Detiege, 358 US. 54
(1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 US. 877
(1955) (beaches).
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and re-enacted and strengthened every law enacted by the
Reconstruction Congress between 1865 and 1875. In addition,
Congress gave the federal government authority to bring
actions against state-wide policies of racial segregation.15 In
1965, Congress enacted a new voting rights law which
superseded in its effectiveness any law previously enacted by it
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment."6
It is important to recall this history of the struggle for civil
rights for blacks in this country because it must inform the
current search for equality between whites and all people of
color, a struggle which causes great anguish and which
threatens our social fabric once again. It is now apparent that
the economic, political and social parallels between the end of
the last century and the era in which we currently live are
numerous. As in the last century, the end of this century sees
us struggling with the issue of the proper role of government
in realizing the promise of equality in the face of great
economic uncertainty. We should all look back but also forward
with an eye to our accomplishments in the area of race
relations and recognize our spectacular gains, made even more
spectacular in the face of the many setbacks along the way
that we have overcome.
The changes that have occurred in American society since
1954 relating to the status of black citizens have been so
dramatic and extensive with respect to the ability of blacks to
participate in this society that many feel that blacks have now
attained all the rights possessed by whites. It is argued that
any further legislation relating to government programs to
improve the status of blacks would give them preferential
status in society as opposed to equal opportunity. As a result,
our society now debates the issue of whether government-
initiated affirmative action programs that open opportunities,
particularly for blacks, should now be ended.
Affirmative action is not a concept new to the United
States. Affirmative action commenced almost immediately
after the Civil War when the Congress set up the Freedmen's
Bureau and private groups embarked upon programs to
educate blacks. After the Brown decision, the issue of
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a(6) (1988).
'Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1988).
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affirmative action again came to the fore-as it had after the
Civil War-as a necessary strategy for educating and training
blacks and for bringing blacks into important societal
institutions.
In the area of education, with the compulsory nature of
elementary and secondary schooling, the terms and conditions
of admission are relatively simple when applied to blacks and
whites. Education beyond the high school level, however, is
subject to both greater competition and modern economic
forces that drive up its cost. It appears that it is this greater
competition and expense-along with the modern economic
forces that require more and more levels of education in order
to achieve economic stability-that make admission to higher
education such a vexing issue today.
During World War II, when men were drafted into the
service and college and graduate school facilities began to lose
their student populations, affirmative action programs arose in
many such institutions to increase the admission of blacks and
women. When I was admitted to Columbia Law School in
February 1944, America had been fighting in the war for two
whole years, and the law school had lost most of its student
population to the various branches of our armed forces. At the
same time, there were very few women and blacks seeking
higher education at that level. At Columbia Law School, for
example, more women and blacks were admitted. In addition,
the law school initiated a program to bring to the law school
those who would not normally be admitted because their
educational backgrounds were not commensurate with those of
regularly admitted students. Nobody complained then about
affirmative action because of the dearth of students seeking
legal education at the time. Most of the blacks who were
admitted under the affirmative action program came from
southern black colleges. Most of them did not survive, dropped
with the lowest fifty percent of the class, as was the practice in
those days. However, others were successful.
The moment the war was over, in August 1945,
aTirmative action ended, and virtually all the seats were filled
by white males. There may have been two women in every
class until the Women's Rights Revolution in the '70s. And
there were never more than two blacks in a class-maybe at
the most three-at any time until the early '80s.
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When Martin Luther King was killed in 1968, many
institutions of higher learning responded to that national
tragedy by opening their institutions to more blacks and by
establishing special programs to tutor blacks and then admit
them. This affirmative action led to the Supreme Court's first
encounter with voluntary affirmative action programs at the
graduate and professional school level outside the South. In a
suit by a white law applicant against the University of
Washington, the Supreme Court refused to consider the issue
because the plaintiff, Mr. DeFunis, was about to finish school
and therefore the issue was moot.'1 Justice Douglas, who by
then was in his last days on the Supreme Court, hastily
dashed off his views on what everyone could see was probably
the most divisive civil rights issue since the Brown case. 8
Reading Justice Douglas's dissent made us all realize that a lot
of hard legal thinking was necessary before we could resolve
that issue-which was not going away. Shortly thereafter, in a
plurality opinion in Bakke, 9 a case involving the Medical
School at the University of California, Justice Powell supplied
an answer which is still the best answer: Race is a factor,
among others, which a state institution may consider in
designing its student body to increase minority presence in the
medical profession.
As the struggle to compete in today's marketplace requires
higher and higher levels of education and as the cost of
education skyrockets, competition for slots in America's places
of higher learning continues to increase. Institutions that may
attempt to incorporate affirmative action considerations in
their admissions policies are swamped with applications and
must turn down many more candidates than they can accept.
As a result, in some instances, rejected white candidates have
sought to blame blacks and other minorities for their woes.
In a recent decision, Hopwood v. Texas,20 a panel of the
Fifth Circuit invalidated an affirmative action program in
which the University of Texas Law School used race as a factor
in its admission policies. The panel did so on the ground that
17 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (i974).
'8 See id. at 320.
"' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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race-based preferences must withstand strict scrutiny. The
panel claimed to rely on the fact that Justice Powell, in his
opinion in Bakke, was the only judge who actually upheld the
use of race as a factor, among others, that a state supported
institution could constitutionally use in selecting students for a
graduate and professional school program promoting diversity
in its admissions policies.
The Fifth Circuit's decision involving the University of
Texas Law School, which comes forty-six years after the
Supreme Court decision in Sweatt v. Painter2 opened the
University of Texas Law School to blacks, has caused great
consternation in the civil rights community. Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit's 1994 decision in Podberesky v. Kirwan
invalidated the University of Maryland's special scholarship for
black students on the ground that the university had failed to
show that it had engaged in past discrimination which would
justify a race-based affimative action program there. The
Supreme Court refused to review that decision. It is pure,
unadulterated irony that the University of Texas Law School,
whose institutional segregation was felled by Marshall as a
lawyer, and the University of Maryland, whose law school
rejected Marshall as a college graduate-applicant on account of
his race in 1930, should be the institutions involved in these
anti-affirmative action decisions. Both circuit courts failed to
note the special complexity of the problem before them. The
Fifth Circuit failed to note that forty years after Brown, Texas
is still maintaining a law school originally built for Sweatt in
1946, when he first applied to the University of Texas Law
School. The Fourth Circuit made no comment about the fact
that Maryland still operates Morgan State, a historically black
college.
These two decisions have come down in the wake of recent
Supreme Court decisions applying the strict scrutiny test to
race-based governmental preferences, namely City of Richmond
v. J. Croson Co.,' and Adarand Contractors v. Pefia.2
Both of these cases involved affirmative action programs
' 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
- 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denkd, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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designed to insure that black construction companies and
workers-along with other "disadvantaged groups" in
Adarand-received a specific preference in bidding for
government contracts.
It should be noted that the question raised by these recent
suits involving affirmative action is how long must the
American community afford special treatment to blacks who
were once a special subject of state discrimination? This is the
difficult question with which we wrestle today. The problem is
that the issue of affirmative action is extremely complex
because it appears in many different forms in many different
contexts, and its continuing propriety in a certain area may be
unjustified while clearly necessary in another. Indeed, for
thirty years the Supreme Court has attempted to juggle not
only the many questions raised but also the interests at stake
in these cases, as exemplified by the line of cases starting with
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.2" and United
Steelworkers v. Weber,26 and ending with the Croson and
Adarand cases described above.
There is obviously a continuing need to require affirmative
action by southern states that still maintain dual school
systems, including separate college and professional schools, as
evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in 1992 in the
University of Mississippi case.27 There the Supreme Court
ruled that Mississippi has the burden of demonstrating that it
has some educational justification for continuing to maintain
and operate separate colleges in Mississippi for blacks and
whites, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision forty-
two years ago in the Brown case. So affirmative action has not
yet run its course in education in the southern states.
In the area of employment discrimination, where blacks
may have made the greatest progress through affirmative
action programs, again, no single affirmative action program is
applicable. Blacks who are seeking entry level jobs and jobs
2' 424 U.S. 747 (1975) (holding that equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 could include the award of retroactive seniority to black employees, even if
that affected the status of white co-workers).
20 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding voluntary, private affirmative action program to
benefit black employees that affected the prospects of white co-workers was
acceptable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
27 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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requiring relatively little education and training probably
made the greatest progress in securing employment in the
American economy. As we proceed up the employment
structure, where the higher level positions require greater and
greater amounts of education, it has been more difficult to
bring in blacks who have the requisite training and ability.
This fact of American life can be traced to the former slave
status of blacks and unequal educational opportunity in society
as a whole. But societal discrimination as a justification for
affirmative action has been ruled out by the Supreme Court in
the Croson and Adarand cases. The Supreme Court's recent
rejections of a societal justification for affirmative action is
odd, however, given the fact that the Court in Brown denied
the individual plaintiffs their personal and present right to
attend previously all white schools in the face of
administrative realities. The Brown Court, when trying to find
an appropriate equitable remedy to deal with segregated
schools in southern school districts, failed to afford the
individual plaintiffs an individualized remedy precisely
because segregation was a long tolerated societal ill involving a
number of states and a problem which had existed for at least
sixty years.
In short, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are
times when individual and personal rights, such as those
sought by the white plaintiffs who attack affirmative action
programs, must give way to the greater societal needs of
rectifying our society's unique experience with racial
segregation, particularly in public education. Indeed, in one of
the very first cases to reach the Supreme Court involving
voluntary affirmative action in employment, Justice Brennan,
in his opinion for the Court, remarked in response to the
minority opinion in that case:
The dissent criticizes the Court's result as not sufficiently cognizant
that it will "directly implicate the rights and expectations of
perfectly innocent employees." We are of the view, however, that the
result which we reach today-which, standing alone, establishes
that a sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is
presumptively necessary-is entirely consistent with any fair
characterization of equity jurisdiction, particularly when considered
in light of our traditional view that a[a]ttainment of a great national
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policy... must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable
relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private
controversies."
It is simply unjust to ask the black community to bear all
of the sequelae of the transition from a segregated society to a
nonsegregated society on the theory that the present day white
majority has little connection to our historic segregated past
and that the sins of their fathers should not be visited upon
them today.
One of the reasons for establishing our Constitution after
the Revolution was that the American people believed, as they
proclaimed in the Preamble, that a constitution governing all
of the people of the United States, who were mainly British
subjects, was necessary, among other things, "to establish
justice." The Constitution as originally drawn made no refer-
ence to the fact that, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, all Americans were considered equal members of
society. Such equality among Americans was simply assumed.
In the case of newly freed slaves, there was no such automatic
assumption. The issue had to be squarely met after emancipa-
tion because of widespread belief in the inherent inferiority of
Africans; and that is why we have a clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution dealing with the issue of
equality. It was recognized by the white leadership class in
1868 that if blacks were to become citizens as a result of that
amendment to the Constitution, justice required that they
have the same status in the American community that white
citizens had. It has taken more than one hundred years for us
to see in the American community substantial numbers of
black people who have succeeded in gaining equal social, politi-
cal and economic status with white citizens.
Notwithstanding all of the social and economic turmoil in
the country, the fact remains that blacks do have equal legal
status in this society. All state laws, policies and regulations
limiting the freedom of black persons in the society have been
stricken as unconstitutional, and Congress has provided them
with many effective remedies for curing any violations of their
rights or privileges based solely on their race. Thus, the major
28 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777-78 (1976) (alterations in
original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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challenge of this society in the twentieth century has been met:
that is, to remove government support for former slave status.
This is not to say that there is no longer any race discrimina-
tion on the part of certain individuals or that we need not be
as vigilant as we once were about monitoring racial discrimina-
tion by government. It only says that our society in this centu-
ry may well have accomplished as much, if not more, than was
accomplished in the last century when slavery was eliminated.
I would suggest that the alarm in the civil rights commu-
nity in the wake of recent court decisions overturning volun-
tary affirmative action remedies in employment and higher
education is understandable. After all, it took sixty years to get
the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson overturned.
It is truly cause for concern that we may have to wait another
sixty years for another Brown decision to usher in a more just
theory of equality under our Constitution. It is clear that some
vestiges of slavery and Plessy still exist and must be remedied.
Thus history teaches us that the issue of racial equality
has not been completely and finally resolved. The struggle for
racial justice is like a prairie fire. You may succeed in stamp-
ing out the struggle for equality in one corner and, lo and be-
hold, it appears soon thereafter somewhere else. We have had
affirmative action, at least as far as the black community is
concerned, since emancipation. Notwithstanding all of the
opposition to equal status for blacks in the American communi-
ty, blacks have never occupied a more equal status in society
than we do today.
Our honoree today, Brian Stevenson, is a reminder, again,
of the fact that you cannot stamp out forever the struggle for
justice in this country. We have had a little more than 200
years of experience with our commitment to justice for all.
That is a very short time in the life of a nation. And for every
civil rights leader who passes on, like Thurgood Marshall, the
torch is passed to the next generation of civil rights warriors
that Mr. Stevenson represents.

